China and the Cook Islands

Increasing economic ties between the Cook Islands and China represent a pivotal shift in regional geopolitics with implications for Australia and New Zealand’s influence in the South Pacific — a region that has often been viewed through a lens of strategic competition between major powers.

Australia and New Zealand, traditionally regarded as regional custodians and counterweights to external influence, do not appear to be curbing China’s growing presence despite their long-standing relations with Pacific Island nations.

In February 2025, the Cook Islands signed several agreements with China, including a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement. These agreements underscore a broader pattern of infrastructure investment characteristic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The resulting projects — ranging from transport networks to telecommunications — are not merely altruistic; they serve to deepen China’s foothold in the region.

The Cook Islands is a self-governing territory in free association with New Zealand. Partnerships with China may provide immediate financial benefits for the Cook Islands, but also create dependencies that could subvert local sovereignty and decision-making abilities. As China enhances its influence through economic entanglement, the Cook Islands could find itself caught in a web of obligations that increasingly align its interests with those of Beijing rather than its traditional allies, changing the geostrategic balance in the region.

Australia and New Zealand have historically engaged in the South Pacific with a focus on development aid, security cooperation and cultural ties. But these methods are proving outdated in the face of China’s proactive diplomatic and economic strategies.

The domestic political environment in Australia and New Zealand limits their capacity to respond. In Australia, domestic climate, immigration and economic priorities shift focus from South Pacific relations to the home front. While Australian politicians publicly advocate for stronger involvement in regional affairs, it is often difficult to galvanise sufficient public support for initiatives aimed at countering Chinese influence, particularly when domestic issues appear more pressing.

In New Zealand, public sentiment and historical ties to the Cook Islands play a role. Its close relationship with the Cook Islands, based on shared citizenship and cultural ties, complicates New Zealand’s ability to adopt an adversarial stance towards Beijing. While New Zealand has expressed concerns over China’s influence, it has often approached these issues with a paternalistic attitude that comes across as a big brother telling off a child, limiting its strategic leverage in negotiating with Pacific nations about their ties to China.

Pacific Islanders often resent Australia and New Zealand exerting their influence, perceiving it as a lingering colonial attitude. Many elites in these Pacific nations argue that given China’s rise, they should not hitch their entire future to the West. US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House reinforces the argument that China is more an opportunity than a threat. If China poses a threat, it is a threat to Australian and New Zealand hegemony in the South Pacific.

Australia and New Zealand are navigating a geopolitical landscape defined by multilateral frameworks that may not favour unilateral or strongly oppositional approaches. Entrenched alliances and commitments to frameworks such as the Pacific Islands Forum often slow down responsive actions. The challenge lies in balancing traditional diplomatic engagements with an effective counterstrategy to China’s advances, while ensuring that local autonomy and agency are respected.

As China deepens its relationships across the Pacific, Australia and New Zealand’s roles risk becoming reactive rather than proactive. Power dynamics will inevitably shift, as smaller nations leverage their relationships with multiple significant players to garner benefits. China’s rising influence can serve as a bargaining chip for the Cook Islands in negotiations with Australia and New Zealand, diminishing traditional power hierarchies.

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters says that he wants a ‘reset‘ in New Zealand’s relationship with the Cook Islands. New Zealand wants the Cook Islands to ‘formally restate’ the mutual responsibilities and boundaries of this relationship.

Along with this, New Zealand and the Cook Islands should sign a new free association pact. The old pact does not work in today’s world where small Pacific countries may have greater agency to promote their interests. The most important element will be New Zealand’s willingness to negotiate as an equal partner, rather than seeing the Cook Islands as its sphere of influence.

Australia and New Zealand must engage Pacific Island nations on terms that emphasise shared interests, development and respect for sovereignty. Australia funding a Papua New Guinea team to enter the National Rugby League and the Australian-led and funded establishment of the Pacific Policing Initiative — an effort to enhance policing capabilities and coordination across the region — represent efforts to counteract Chinese influence in this way.

Despite Pacific Island nations struggling with costly and inefficient freight cargo transport, Australia has hesitated to address the critical area of logistics. Australia should consider spearheading and jointly owning a regional shipping company to tackle this challenge.

Navigating this complex geopolitical landscape will determine not just Australia and New Zealand’s standing in the South Pacific but also broader dynamics of great power competition. China’s growing influence in the Cook Islands symbolises a potentially transformative moment in South Pacific geopolitics, requiring Australia and New Zealand to adapt to this new reality.

China’s expansion into the South Pacific aligns with its broader strategy of extending influence over smaller countries, leveraging economic incentives as enticements. The era when Pacific Island nations automatically turned to Australia and New Zealand for guidance is over, and policymakers in Canberra and Wellington need to recognise this shift. Rather than merely responding to Beijing’s actions, they must proactively acknowledge that regional power dynamics have fundamentally changed.

This article was published by the East Asia Forum.