Rationalising space logistics

Space logistics technologies are gaining greater momentum as we deepen our reliance on space. These are the various technologies that provide reliable delivery of supplies to satellites and space stations and in future to lunar and Martian orbits too. They can remotely repair and refuel satellites to increase their lifespan and put off the cost of replacement. These technologies can also help in clearing space debris. Their benefits across the space domain are significant.

Without these technologies and tools, our ability for long-term, sustained operations in space is hampered. But rendezvous and proximity operations (RPOs)—a critical aspect of space logistics—also come with new challenges. While there are many layers of challenges, including technological and legal, security concerns have been dominant in today’s international political context, which is detailed in a new report launched by ASPI today.

For all their benefits, RPO technologies are dual use. They can also interfere with other countries’ space operations. Technologies that can be used to remotely repair a satellite or remove a piece of space debris can also be used to degrade or destroy someone else’s satellite.

Given the dual use nature of RPO technologies and the context of great power competition, states do not feel assured that they can trust others’ RPOs. Indeed, there is a key question of intent, yet there is no effective means to verify somebody’s intent in wielding a particular technology. Any disruption in space can be severely impactful, so even accidents will be regarded with suspicion.

This can have a cascading effect: unless space sustainability is considered at every step of states’ and other stakeholders’ space activities, continued access to the limited number of usable orbits may be at risk.

That just a few stakeholders control RPO technologies makes those who do not have them vulnerable. But a sense of vulnerability even extends to states possessing RPOs: there’s a constant worry, driven by suspicion and rivalry, that their space assets may be targeted.

Therefore, there is an urgent need to develop pragmatic and practical protocols that can balance the plusses and minuses of RPOs to offset their negative security consequences.

Despite space treaties’ limitations, they continue to be relevant. For instance, several clauses of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)—the foundational treaty governing space activities—remain vital in maintaining space as a global common. In the context of RPO missions, the ‘due regard’ principle contained in Article IX of the OST would mean that states should be held responsible and ensure that they are conducted in a manner that does not violate other states’ rights and interests.

Similarly, the Liability Convention of 1972 has direct implications for RPOs in case of an incident in space. But several regulatory challenges in the safe conduct of RPOs have not yet been legally considered. For example, who determines whether a piece of space debris needs to be removed? Many older satellites are military satellites, and therefore sensitive in nature, so, in determining whether a particular piece of space junk should be removed, states may be disinclined to trust each other. It doesn’t help that there are as yet no standard operating procedures for such situations.

Disruptions in outer space will immediately be felt around the world as our daily lives depend heavily on space services. This includes, for instance, weather forecasting, telecommunications and GPS navigation. No society will be immune from this. Given this dependence, all space stakeholders need to take the lead in promoting good practices, guidelines and other good neighbourly courtesy measures to help maintain the sanctity of outer space.

Some such measures could include sustainable practices, such as adopting debris mitigation plans through the deliberate and planned de-orbiting of satellites at the end of their lives. This could manage the already congested space and prevent collisions.

Some new regulations have come into effect in recent years to address these problems, but none is binding. For example, the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee has set a 25-year period for satellites to be de-orbited after the ends of their missions. For the US Federal Communication Commission, that period is five years.

While we await legally binding measures, we need to seriously consider norms as well as adopt a voluntary ethical approach to how we engage with RPOs and space logistics capabilities. In the current international political climate, we would need to start with common courtesy measures and good practices before developing the necessary consensus to finalise legal measures.

This article was published by The Strategist.