Australia’s role in a multi-polar world

In the coming multipolar order, New Zealand and Australia need to shape a new regional economic and security project.

If middle powers do not shape a new Indo-Pacific order, the region will be caught up in and shaped by competing great powers, including the United States, a now unpredictable ally. China in particular is looking to shape the coming multipolar order, and within this, secure Indo-Pacific leadership. The world is at a crossroads between two global orders: the outgoing Western-led rules-based order and an incoming multipolar order.

Australia and New Zealand need to avoid piecemeal, reactive responses. They should instead navigate the chaotic years between the unipolar and multipolar systems by proactively working to shape a cohesive region that can resist great-power pressure.

In a November Foreign Affairs article, US historian Sarah Paine described the current rules-based order as a maritime order, which clearly benefits maritime trading countries such as Australia and New Zealand. A maritime order promotes globalised free trade, and is sustained by international institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations which ensure collective security and international rules. Those rules are needed to reduce the transaction costs of international trade and subsequently maximise wealth gain.

However, the current US administration does not prioritise international institutional power, instead favouring concentrated presidential strongman power. Explaining the administration’s withdrawal from a number of international organisations, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that the international system is a ‘sprawling global governance architecture’, that is ‘detached from national interests’. And President Donald Trump has declared that although he recognises international law, he is ultimately guided by his own morality and interests. Trump’s administration also prefers bilateral dealmaking over complex alliance maintenance.

China is looking to shape the coming multipolar order, and within this, secure leadership of the Asia-Pacific region. Its diplomacy with Pacific island states and other Global South countries emphasises its Global Civilization Initiative, Global Governance Initiative, Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Belt and Road Initiative as tools to build ‘a community with a shared future for mankind’. President Xi Jinping is working to position China to lead a reformed rules-based order through south-south cooperation. For instance, Xi has stated that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation should serve as a ‘catalyst for the development and reform of the global governance system’.

The US National Security Strategy, published in December, focused on establishing US dominance in the western hemisphere, and Trump has pursued a protectionist trade policy. In contrast, China continues to open to the world. China recognises the growing unpopularity of Trump’s international strategy, and has asserted that ‘might does not make right’ and that China stands unequivocally against ‘hegemonism and power politics’.

However, a multipolar world is not just an opportunity for rising great powers, but also for middle powers working to stabilise the system against the mechanisations of the US, China and Russia. For instance, in this year’s annual foreign policy press conference, Indonesia’s foreign minister outlined the country’s ‘network based resilience’ strategy, and emphasised the importance of its independent foreign policy to avoid being caught up in strategic competition.

Another case to consider is Turkey joining Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s security treaty. Given global uncertainty, it appears that these three countries seek a multi-layered security architecture. They also potentially seek to establish varying alliances to serve as multiple options, only as useful and reliable as interests are aligned on a case-by-case basis.

Considering these shifts, and the benefits of a law-based maritime order, Australia, New Zealand and their near neighbours need to leverage multiple instruments of power and work to secure supply chains, trading routes and international law while pursuing ‘connections with others to create wealth and derive national security from wealth and friends’.

However, as the Cook Islands’ comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with China demonstrates, there are other players looking to establish friendships in the Pacific and Asia. Moreover, Australia and New Zealand are anglosphere Global North states in the Global South, and as such need a unifying strategic narrative for their region’s security and economic prosperity that binds the diverse middle and small powers together.

This would avoid a reactive piecemeal, minilateral approach that responds to each cascading event as the current order further unravels, failing to create a secure regional security complex that responds to new challenges. With the potential fracturing of the Western alliance, and the uncertainty of US security guarantees, New Zealand and Australia need to think carefully about their interests and how best to position themselves in Southeast Asia and the Pacific in a multipolar order.

Australia and New Zealand need to decide how to navigate the chaotic years between orders, when contestation over the shape of emerging world order is high. Multipolar orders are strongly regional, therefore Australia and New Zealand need to work with their neighbours to shape a unifying strategic narrative and institutional structure for the region that powerfully leverages the influence of the region’s middle powers. It also makes sense to engage in creative thinking about security options should Oceania be neglected in the future by an embattled and divided West.