Yesterday’s announcement that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had directed at least two antisemitic attacks in Australia confirmed that foreign regimes are interfering in our societies. They’re doing it not just to illegally protect their domestic interests but to divide our nation.
As the government expelled Iran’s ambassador in response, Director-General of Security Mike Burgess told us the IRGC was behind attacks on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne and on Lewis’ Continental Kitchen in Sydney. These were not random acts of hate. They were deliberate operations designed to intimidate Australia’s Jewish community and fracture Australian society from within.
Iran was exporting its ideological hatred and violence to our streets.
This combination of terrorism and foreign interference, while not unprecedented, is more than just the standard national security threat. As Burgess said, ‘The IRGC has form in … going after dissidents or anything they consider a threat to the regime in other countries.’ But in this instance its activities amounted to much more. It was, he said, ‘having a crack at our social cohesion.’
This is recognition that our open and free society is vulnerable to exploitation by foreign powers—not just Iran, but China and Russia, too—and that security is required not to constrain openness and freedoms but to maintain them.
The government was right to act so decisively. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese made clear Iran’s actions would not be tolerated. Foreign Minister Penny Wong confirmed the first expulsion from Australia of an ambassador since World War II. And Home Affairs Minister Tony Burke emphasised the corrosive nature of antisemitism. It matters that we name the crime for what it is. It affirms to Australia’s Jewish community they are not alone and calls out the Iran regime’s modus operandi in plain terms—vital for a public still uncertain about the impact of hybrid threats that fall short of war.
At the centre of our defence sits the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. Its role here is uniquely complex. Detecting the hand of a foreign intelligence service behind an apparently criminal act requires the fusion of counterespionage, counterterrorism and criminal intelligence. It means following networks where ideology, money, coercion and covert state direction intersect.
Unlike a traditional espionage case, or a standalone terrorist cell, these attacks sat in a grey zone where a state actor outsourced violence to intermediaries who could be disavowed if exposed. Proving that link—tracing how an illicit-tobacco kingpin, an arsonist or a street-level criminal connects back to a general in Tehran—is the kind of invisible work that makes Australians safer yet rarely receives public recognition.
The IRGC has been at this for decades. It has promoted terrorism abroad while sponsoring proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. Its operatives have been linked to the 2012 bombing of an Israeli diplomat’s car in New Delhi, to attempted targeting of Israeli diplomats in Thailand and to an assassination plot against US President Donald Trump. This is a regime skilled at managing crises at home while exporting violence abroad.
Similarly, Russia wages conventional war in Ukraine while conducting cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and covert operations across Europe. Both countries thrive on hybrid warfare—blurring lines between soldiers and criminals, terrorists and proxies, influence and intimidation.
So, why us? In part, because our democracy necessarily protects such rights as peaceful protest. Yet at too many rallies in recent months we have seen flags of Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic State and even portraits of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Peaceful protest should be defended, but illegal displays of support for terrorist organisations cannot be excused as free expression. For Iran, these displays revealed a vulnerability in our society, an opportunity that it could exploit.
This is why the government’s announcement that the IRGC will be listed as a terrorist organisation is necessary. Canada, the US, Sweden, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have already taken that step, while Britain is moving to legislate new powers. Aligning with partners on this makes Australia a harder target and signals to Tehran its behaviour carries real consequences.
That these activities involve both foreign interference and terrorism should not be underplayed. An inquiry into the definition of terrorism is underway, raising the possibility, for example, that damaging property will no longer count. The risk is that diluting the definition in such ways will allow terrorists to get away with lesser criminal charges, such as arson.
The decisions to expel the ambassador and list the IRGC will have diplomatic consequences. Australia has maintained an embassy in Tehran since the 1960s, and its announced closure, which will be at least temporary, will limit Australia’s ability to help individuals and influence the region. But the decision is prudent. The risk of arbitrary detention of Australians in Iran has long been high, as illustrated by the wrongful imprisonment of Australian–British academic Kylie Moore-Gilbert from 2018 to 2020. The benefits of diplomatic presence can never justify tolerating state-sponsored terror and interference against our communities.
From these divisive and dangerous acts, the unifying message is clear both for Australians and our work with allies: hybrid warfare is not just a problem for Europe and the Middle East. It is here, now, in Australia. It looks like antisemitic violence in Melbourne. It looks like arson in Sydney. It is a hostile state trying to divide Australians against each other. And national measures combined with international collective action is required to counter it.
By unpicking the IRGC’s modus operandi—its use of proxies, criminals and covert intimidation—Australia has shown its own community and allies and partners the clear and present danger of hybrid threats and how they need to be confronted. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation has made visible the invisible, and the government’s swift response has sent the right messages: Australia is not a soft target; state-sponsored interference will be met with resolve; and our democracy is strong enough to defend all its people and their freedoms—whether of faith or, indeed, no faith.
But strength at home is measured not only in deterrence but also in cohesion. As Burke reminded us, Australians of Iranian heritage must not be scapegoated for the actions of a hostile regime. Protecting Australia means standing firm against foreign interference while ensuring every community knows they belong. Security without cohesion is fragile. Security with cohesion is unbreakable.
