How should Albanese handle Trump?

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese will meet US President Donald Trump in Washington on 20 October. This will be the first official meeting between the two leaders since Trump’s inauguration in January.

Here are ASPI analysts’ views on the visit, including what Albanese and Trump may discuss, and what it could mean for Australia.

Justin Bassi, the Executive Director of ASPI says “Albanese has timed his run at Trump to perfection: Trump is riding high after bringing together a diverse collection of nations to land the most significant deal in the Middle East in generations. Albanese himself is flying following diplomatic success in the Pacific, including a new defence treaty with Papua New Guinea.

Trump will likely be keen to maintain the public narrative of international leadership. This offers the best chance for a positive environment wherein the leaders can reinforce that their respective national security interests lie in the shared responsibility of protecting international principles and rules in the Indo-Pacific.

AUKUS should be given the green light and once again confirmed as the foundation of Australia’s security and vital to the United States’ interest in competing with a rising Beijing-led authoritarian axis. China will likely be the focal point of discussions even if it is rarely mentioned publicly: AUKUS, critical minerals, cyber and critical technologies are frontline agenda topics, and all are about China.

Some commentators have suggested that Albanese take a risk-free approach, either not meeting or only aiming for the status quo so he can get in and out unscathed. However, there is an opportunity to practically supercharge cooperation, for example by leveraging complementary strengths in critical minerals and technology. This would make the meeting far more consequential than some have indicated. Both leaders and nations should be ambitious about the relationship and its implications for national and regional security.”

Mike Hughes, the Director of ASPI’s Defence Strategy programme, agrees that “Next week’s meeting will be a defining moment of Albanese’s term. The US has abandoned its role as the primary architect, advocate and guarantor of the post-war international order. It has adopted illiberal values, focused on imagined internal enemies and abused its partners while courting authoritarians. This has ignited the worst fears about the US that have long simmered at the heart of the Labor caucus.

But with the international system in tatters and China intent on instituting its own global order, Albanese knows he needs to safeguard the US alliance as the pillar of Australia’s security. His mid-year doubling down on economic relations with China relies on that guarantee. The US is heading in a direction that appears discordant with ours, but China has done worse over a longer period and with greater intent to harm. Just as Albanese has engaged China, he must also engage the US to ensure its commitment to issues that matter to us.

Albanese can’t mention the truth: the alliance has given us far more than we’ve put in. But he can present initiatives that show Australia’s value to the US, including: our AUKUS commitment; investment in Australian Defence Force capabilities and defence industry partnerships with Japan and South Korea; a Pacific integration agenda recently buttressed by the Pukpuk Treaty; and commitment to training, exercises and US Force Posture Initiatives. These are necessary investments to safeguard Australia’s interests, and Albanese’s success will be measured by how much Trump is convinced they’re also investments in US interests.”

Courtney Stewart, the Deputy Director of ASPI’s Defence Strategy Programme, notes “The fact that the leader of Australia’s government hasn’t met with its number one security and defence partner in the 11 months since Trump’s election may seem concerning. It’s not. Australians, both inside and outside of government, work with Americans every day. This cooperation—taking place across economic and financial, informational and intelligence, cultural, military and diplomatic domains—advances areas of mutual interest that require and demonstrate a high degree of trust.

That is why this meeting matters—trust goes both ways. We should expect deals and commitments on areas of greatest strategic alignment: critical minerals, the role of the alliance in regional stability, the importance of AUKUS, and a pragmatic approach to tariffs that protect both countries’ supply chains.

Canberra will likely advocate for capability-led defence spending, as well as sovereign decision-making around both the use of joint facilities and ADF commitments to future crises. Washington will likely push for greater and faster delivery of capability that contributes to preventing war and a strong shield of deterrence. If both leaders focus on mutual advantage, the visit should be a success.”

John Coyne, the Director of ASPI’s National Security Programmes thinks “It’s increasingly likely that the Trump–Albanese meeting will deliver an announcement on critical minerals. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s call for allies to coordinate against China’s sweeping new export controls has set the stage for a deal. But if experience tells us anything, the challenge isn’t the signing of another agreement; it’s delivering one that truly changes supply-chain realities.

Building resilient, competitive and secure critical-mineral supply chains requires more than new mines. It demands investment in midstream processing, refining and offtake frameworks that turn potential into product. For Australia, this is a pivotal moment. A US commitment to invest in Australia’s critical minerals reserve or to co-develop processing capacity would inject both credibility and capital into the sector.

The conversation must also evolve from the abstract ‘critical minerals’ and address specific resources—such as rare earths, lithium, and graphite—and the unique geopolitical, environmental and industrial challenges they each present. A strategic, targeted partnership could shift the balance of global supply resilience, but it will require both nations to move beyond symbolism to substance.”

James Corera, the Director of ASPI’s Cyber, Technology and Security programme argues that “While headlines around next week’s meeting will likely focus on the AUKUS review, prospective tariff arrangements and the personal chemistry between leaders, the trip has greater strategic significance. The Australian delegation will likely arrive well-prepared to make a case for Australia’s value to the second Trump administration with clarity, confidence and practicality.

Canberra may emphasise Australia’s role in furthering US interests in the Indo-Pacific—that it is trusted, capable and willing to shoulder greater responsibility. This is not about being Washington’s deputy sheriff, but rather a partner delivering practical outcomes consistent with its own interests. These include accelerating joint critical minerals projects to reduce supply-chain leverage; deepening cooperation on critical and emerging technologies such as quantum, AI and cyber; and expanding defence-industrial integration under AUKUS Pillar Two.

It remains uncertain whether China will be an explicit focus of public discussions. But in many ways, such framing may no longer be necessary. The substance of the agenda will almost certainly centre on convergent national interests: ensuring a safe and resilient Indo-Pacific, maintaining technological edge and supply-chain assurance, and reinforcing deterrence through capability rather than rhetoric. Seen through this lens, the visit is more about alignment than optics. It will be an opportunity to underscore Australia’s strategic utility, economic complementarity and role as a steady enabler for US engagement in the Indo-Pacific.”

Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a resident senior fellow at ASPI believes that “Albanese has a couple of cards he can play at next week’s meeting to reaffirm Australia’s importance and strengthen the Australia–US alliance and Quad (comprising Australia, the US, Japan and India). Quite strikingly, Albanese is meeting Trump at a time when US-China tensions are growing due to factors including tariff troubles and China’s curtailing of rare earth exports. This benefits Australia and the Quad as it reaffirms their importance to the US in the face of a resolute and aggressive China.

Most importantly, even if it can’t match China, Australia has a rare earth advantage. This will be crucial to Trump as it could help Western partners resist China’s blackmail. Trump is particularly focused on the rare earth issues: it has, for example, played a role in his policy towards Ukraine and Pakistan.

Albanese could also help strengthen the Quad. It seems unlikely that we will see a Quad summit this year, at least partly due to difficulties between Trump and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi that have seemed more personal than strategic. Albanese may have an opportunity to calm the waters between these two strong personalities. It is in Australia’s interest to not let this personality clash undermine the Quad.”

Nishank Motwani, a senior fellow at ASPI USA argues that “Trump’s ‘America First’ policy will require Albanese to demonstrate how Australia’s contributions to the alliance advance US power in the Indo-Pacific.

The principal matter for Albanese to recognise is that, for Trump, all agreements are negotiable—not once, but repeatedly. This includes AUKUS, currently under review by the Pentagon. Another issue is Australia’s defence spending and the speed at which it deploys capital, acquires new capabilities, builds key infrastructure and takes the lead on Pacific engagement to counter Chinese influence.

For Trump, allied dependency translates to leverage. In practice, this dependency works to Trump’s advantage, allowing the US to extract more to get a better deal. Consequently, no deal is final, and the commercialisation of US foreign and defence policy means Albanese needs to show that Australia can give more than it receives. Given Trump’s style of renegotiating agreements to deliver better deals and outcomes, it would be unsurprising to see a rebranding of AUKUS coupled with a higher dollar figure.

Trump bemoans burden, and a relationship he labels ‘free riding’ is fair game for renegotiation. Albanese can avoid this label by highlighting Australia’s existing investments, including in AUKUS, while committing to greater efforts. Albanese should keep in mind, however, that Trump may expect even more at their next meeting.”

Greg Brown, a senior fellow at ASPI USA notes “The 10 months it has taken to schedule a meeting show where Australia sits in the US’s strategic calculus: not very high, and the arithmetic explains why.

The Pentagon is reviewing AUKUS to determine whether it ‘meets America First criteria.’ That is Washington-speak for a straightforward question: does this deal advance US power in the Pacific, or does it divert assets to support Australia’s quarter-speed defence spending increases?

Moreover, to Washington, the Australian government’s recognition of Palestinian statehood may look like posturing on issues peripheral to core security interests, at a time when Canberra expects US strategic underwriting in the Indo-Pacific. That move introduces friction precisely when Washington needs reliable partners executing complementary strategies against Beijing.

Alliances need constant management. Trump will likely offer Albanese public reassurance while pressing him to demonstrate willingness to shoulder proportionate costs and risks. For the White House, the question is not whether the US values the alliance, but whether Australia values it enough to pay the cost of securing shared interests.”

Jenny Wong Leung, a data scientist in ASPI’s Cyber, Technology and Security programme observes that “This meeting comes at a time when technology sits at the centre of strategic competition. States are restricting access to critical capabilities and exploiting their dual-use potential in ways that challenge sovereignty and security. ASPI’s Critical Technology Tracker shows that China leads global high-impact research on critical minerals extraction and processing—resources essential to the technologies that are critical to both our economy and national security.

The US (second place) and Australia (fourth place) have an excellent opportunity to not only secure critical minerals, but work with trusted partners on critical technologies—some of which are dependent on critical minerals—to reduce China’s potential monopoly in many of these technologies.”

This article was published by The Strategist.