The counter-hybrid playbook

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European leaders have done their utmost to contain the conflict. But now, as Moscow shifts hybrid warfare tactics into NATO territory, European countries’ collective defence posture can look fragile. A closer look, however, suggests that Europe’s counter-hybrid playbook—although imperfect—has delivered deterrence precisely because no better options exist. That same playbook shows Indo-Pacific leaders what’s missing from theirs as they similarly confront hybrid threat campaigns.

Moscow’s hybrid campaign has been waged for more than a decade: persistent cyber operations; the little green men in Crimea; assassinations and assassination attempts; sabotage of supply chains and factories; disruption of land and subsea communication cables; strikes near British and EU diplomatic missions in Kyiv; and frequent incursions by fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, drones, submarines and frigates—at times deep—into NATO territory.

What used to be isolated flash incidents have hardened into a pattern of normalised, low-grade but highly disruptive provocations, especially since August’s Alaska Summit between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Since 2022, at least 25 Russian drones and crewed aircraft have violated the airspaces of Estonia, Poland, Sweden, Latvia and Romania. Neither the group of drones sent into Poland on 9 September nor the three Russian MiG-31 fighters that crossed into Estonian airspace on 20 September would have posed a technical or operational challenge to NATO’s collective air defence. The challenge is political and strategic.

Russia may not want open war—even though it is signalling a willingness to fight one—but it thrives in a hybrid environment. It can continue probing NATO through land, sea, air, space or cyber operations, and allies must prevent such provocations from becoming routine and normalised. Meanwhile, Europe still needs to piece together a credible security backstop for Ukraine as long as the United States’ commitment to Ukraine and NATO remains ambiguous.

While the Indo-Pacific is a different theatre, it faces a similar security challenge: dealing with an increasingly assertive state determined to revise the status quo. China, in a ‘no-limits’ partnership with Russia, has embraced hybrid warfare to equally disruptive effect.

As ASPI’s State of the Strait reports show, Taiwan is the primary target of Beijing’s hybrid pressure campaign, facing near-weekly cyber intrusions, economic coercion, disinformation and military intimidation. The Philippines is another frontline state facing maritime intimidation, cyberattacks, disinformation operations and lawfare.

So, what can the Indo-Pacific take from Europe’s counter-hybrid playbook?

First, leaders should call out aggression. After the drone intrusion into Poland, all NATO and EU leaders, in their own words, condemned the act and expressed solidarity. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer called it ‘the egregious and unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace’. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas stressed ‘it was intentional, not accidental’ while NATO allies described it as ‘reckless’ and ‘dangerous’.

Significantly, Hungary and Slovakia—whose leaders often operate on friendly terms with Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping—joined the chorus, calling the incursion ‘unacceptable’.

Secondly, states should conduct high-level consultations mechanisms among partners. At Poland’s and Estonia’s request, NATO’s North Atlantic Council held Article 4 consultations, a mechanism to discuss imminent security concerns of one or more allies.

Similarly, the European Union’s Political and Security Committee coordinated a joint position on behalf of all 27 member states. Meanwhile, Europe’s five leading defence spenders (‘the E5’)—Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Poland—gathered in London and agreed to explore deploying more anti-drone equipment as well as cyber and electromagnetic warfare capabilities.

This leads to a third element: countering hybrid threats involves reinforcing existing defence and resilience capabilities and extending support to victim states. In response to September’s airspace violations, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, US General Alexus Grynkewich, announced the launch of Eastern Sentry—a deployment of additional air defence assets, aircraft and an anti-air warfare frigate to the eastern border.

Britain announced it would begin mass-producing interceptor drones based on Ukrainian technology, while Ukrainian operators joined a NATO exercise testing commercial anti-drone systems. The European Commission expedited funding for a Baltic drone wall and introduced a 19th sanctions package, targeting Russian liquefied natural gas imports and additional financial enablers.

This playbook is an example of different states and regional bodies working in sync, united by the common goal of defending the region’s territorial integrity and independence. It further shows that visible solidarity, timely coordination and layered deterrence can blunt an adversary’s attempts to normalise hybrid aggression. The Indo-Pacific can achieve the same, without binding itself into legal structures or mutual-defence pacts, if it builds a trusted, permanent framework for cooperative defence against hybrid threats.

European leaders were naive to think Russia’s war could be contained to Ukrainian territory. Some argue that Europe should be able to field more military might to force Russia to change its actions and that more should have been done to stop Russia’s aggression in the first place. That’s right, but it would be a misjudgement to dismiss what has been achieved, albeit through trial and error.

The lesson for the Indo-Pacific is also clear: investments in defence and resilience matter, but countering hybrid threats requires, above all, unity, coordination and resolve. Through strong leadership and steady diplomatic legwork, regional powers can achieve this without sliding into open conflict.

This article was published by The Conversation.