Special forces

Observers and practitioners of intelligence and special operations would do well to study the activities of Israel’s clandestine services and elite military units since 7 October 2023. They demonstrate the potency of creative clandestine operations, strategic patience and operational aggression.

These feats offer Australia a masterclass in the use of special operations in modern state-on-state conflict. They demonstrate the necessity of clandestine special operations and the long-term planning and preparation such activities require.

Israel has been both a perpetrator and victim of surprise attacks and clandestine operations, including the assassinations of the architects of the 1972 Munich massacre. It has historically placed high value on such capabilities, showing that its strategic culture is tolerant of significant risk.

Israel’s military actions against Iran in 2024 and 2025 prove that this tradition continues. Israel’s special operations and intelligence elements have repeatedly pulled off complex, multi-domain activities that orchestrated special operators, human-intelligence networks and conventional military forces. This has allowed Israel to conduct long-range strikes in a highly hostile environment. These successes should not be forgotten amid legitimate controversies regarding Israeli military action in Gaza.

An assault on an Iranian underground missile production facility in Syria in September 2024 was a textbook case of a long-range raid. Israeli commandos were able to detonate explosives within the facility and withdraw with zero casualties. Conducted in coordination with conventional forces, this raid inflicted severe damage on Iran’s ability to locally resupply Hezbollah.

The pager attack on Hezbollah and its Iranian support network in Lebanon in September 2024 is another example of how intelligence and special operations forces can leverage surprise to inflict grievous blows upon an adversary. The attack and subsequent media coverage also achieved a powerful psychological effect. The operation relied upon patience and care in establishing commercial platforms used to procure, sabotage and distribute the pagers themselves. Despite its impact, it would have required significant resources for what was probably judged to be a low-to-moderate prospect of success. It appears to have had high-level political backing, as indicated by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s reported approval of the attack.

Perhaps Israel’s greatest achievement is its operating with apparent near impunity inside Iran itself. Israeli intelligence service Mossad and special forces operators, aided by human-intelligence networks reportedly composed of Indian and Afghan nationals, are reported to have sabotaged Iran’s air defence network and provided data for bombing of Iran’s most important military facilities. Extensive clandestine infrastructure was also established, including safehouses and pre-positioned missiles. The assassination of many of Iran’s top military leaders also indicates Israel’s deep presence in Iran’s military apparatus, as well as massive Iranian counterintelligence failures.

Israel’s experience presents lessons for Australia.

Israel’s successes have been the product of many years of effort, determined focus and adequate resourcing. The kind of human intelligence and technical networks needed for such operations cannot be conjured at the eleventh hour. They require long-term planning and implementation, and the patience to build operational infrastructure. Further, to be successful, they must be placed in the charge of a cadre of specialist, highly motivated individuals that are expensive and impractical to mass produce.

Secondly, Israel’s example demonstrates the ongoing military necessity of clandestine special operations. Australia’s special operations community has been marred by various accusations of misconduct and tasked to reorientate an operating model developed for past conflicts. But the need for highly trained troops who can operate far forward of friendly lines shouldn’t be forgotten.

Thirdly, the Israeli case study shows that special operations forces are best employed in a manner which is creative, bold and operationally aggressive. They must also be underpinned by a strong foundation of political will. Such operations do not lend themselves to predictable bureaucratic decision cycles or abstract press releases. Australia’s future political and military leadership may have to formulate decisions in volatile and uncertain conditions where special operations may be a risky, but lone, response option.

Israel’s successes are a buttress to conventional troops, not a silver bullet. Yet, unique geographical and cultural factors made Israel’s operations possible, so while these operations can inspire Australia’s own efforts, they are not suitable as a template. Nevertheless, they can inform discussion of the future of Australia’s special operations and intelligence capabilities, and how they may be employed.

This article was published by The Strategist.